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*IIC 249  The question this article addresses is whether patent law is the 
appropriate forum to ban polluting inventions, especially those that emit 
greenhouse gases. To answer this question, this paper scrutinises the functions 
and justifications for patent law, the morality and ordre public provision (Art. 
53(a) European Patent Convention) and supplementary protection certificates, 
along with the relevant case law and literature. This paper finds that patent law 
is only apparently neutral, and therefore this is not a hindrance to its having a 
role to play in prohibiting polluting technologies and also in encouraging the 
invention and use of clean technologies. This is also congruent with current 
patent law rationales and arguments advanced by commentators, and others 
advocated by the author. This paper concludes that European patent laws should 
be modified to strengthen the prohibition of polluting inventions and grant 
favoured treatment to green inventions, especially those reducing greenhouses 
gases in the earth's atmosphere.   
*IIC 250  Introduction   
Few would now deny that humans are causing the global warming of the planet to the 
extent that our survival is threatened.1 The so-called “ green-house effect”  or “ climate 
change”  is mainly caused by the release of too many “ greenhouse gases”  (GHG) into the 
atmosphere.2 The numbers speak for themselves. For instance, about 80% of the extra 
man-made CO2 comes from burning oil, coal and gas, and 20% from deforestation or other 
land changes.3 In the European Union (EU), the transport sector is the fastest growing 
source of CO2 emissions.4 In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
already stated that to stabilise concentrations of CO2, current emissions would have to be 
reduced by between 60 and 80%.5   
The main cause of the increase in GHG emissions is no doubt industrial development. A 
major inducement for industrial development is arguably the law itself. Patent law and its 
alternatives (confidential information or trade secrets) were created chiefly as an incentive 
to innovate6 and thus put new technologies on the market. Patent protection was launched 
at the same time as industrialisation.7 And “ each increase in the level of patent protection 
corresponds to progress in the industrialisation process” ,8 although there is no conclusive 
evidence of a link between the two.9 Since the 1990s, *IIC 251  the EU has done a lot to 
reduce GHG emissions by way of environmental Directives and Regulations. As bluntly 
stated by one of the chief architects of solutions to global warming, Yvo de Boer, we need 
regulation; the lack of a legal framework is one of the factors why nothing happens.10 The 
question this statement triggers is whether patent laws should do something too. Can 
patent law be a “ tool of environmental policy” ?11 Is it the role of patent law to further 
environmental protection? Would not an eco-friendly patent law send a message to 
inventors that they cannot patent “ everything under the sun” ? If it does not, the sun 
might stay but the earth, including inventors and inventions, might disappear….  
The question this article poses is whether patent law is an appropriate forum to protect the 
environment and, more particularly, reduce the release of GHG into the atmosphere. The 
underlying aim of this article is to discover whether patent law is intrinsically, explicitly or 
implicitly, directly or indirectly, geared to the protection of the environment or not. To 
answer this question, the article first reminds us of the roles and justifications for patent 
law (section 1). After having discovered that none of the patent functions and justifications 
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refer to the environment, let alone to the reduction in GHG emissions, an analysis of 
positive law shows that, despite patent law's apparent neutrality, it carries the seeds of 
differentiation and can therefore allow for special treatment of “ green inventions”  (section 
2). The as yet very few commentators who have written about the topic also agree that 
patent law should differentiate in some cases, including environmental protection (section 
3). This article answers the question from a European perspective, therefore concentrating 
on EU and European law (mainly the European Patent Convention (EPC)) as well as national 
patent laws (with an avowed bias towards UK law).  
1. Patent Law Rationales: Justifications, Functions and Roles, or 
Ideology?   
There are four main justifications for patents. As has been noted, these were the original 
ones proposed to introduce patents in the 19th century and they have still not changed 
much today.12 One first simple reason is that it is just that the inventor be granted 
exclusive property rights on his or her invention. In other words, it is fair that inventors 
should be rewarded for their innovations. A second reason, which can be said to be a 
sub-category of this *IIC 252  “ justice argument” , is the so-called labour (based on John 
Locke's writings13 ) or natural rights theory. A third justification for patents is to give 
inventors an incentive to innovate (utilitarian rationale). Finally, patent laws can also be 
based on a social contract. According to this theory, the patentee obtains an exclusive right 
on his invention but in return he must disclose it to the public in such a way that it can be 
understood and reproduced by persons skilled in the art. According to this theory, patent 
law's function is an informative one.  
There is a fifth justification that Machlup and Penrose, unsurprisingly, did not mention. It is 
based on Kant's and Hegel's writings.14 The theory can be briefly summarised as follows. 
“ Property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of some fundamental human needs; 
policymakers should thus strive to create and allocate entitlements to resources in the 
fashion that best enables people to fulfil those needs.” 15 Therefore, intellectual property 
rights should be recognised to protect the personality that creators express through their 
intellectual productions or because the rights will “ create conditions conducive to creative 
intellectual activity, which in turn is important to human flourishing” .16 Fisher summarises 
as follows: J. Hughes' reading of Hegel's philosophy is applied to intellectual property, 
which is, he notes, probably one of the most developed. Hughes  
derives from Hegel's Philosophy of Right the following guidelines concerning the proper 
shape of an intellectual property system: (a) We should be more willing to accord legal 
protection to the fruits of highly expressive intellectual activities, such as the writing of 
novels, than the fruits of less expressive activities, such as genetic research. (b) Because 
a person's “ persona”  - his “ public image including his physical features, mannerisms and 
history”  - is an important “ receptacle for personality” , it deserves generous legal 
protection, despite the fact that ordinarily it does not result from labour. (c) Authors and 
inventors should be permitted to earn respect, honour, admiration and money from the 
public by selling or giving away copies of their works, but should not *IIC 253  be 
permitted to surrender their right to prevent others from mutilating or misattributing their 
works.17   
As can readily be seen, this theory has mainly been used to justify the granting of moral 
rights (paternity, integrity) to authors of literary works and the like. As patent law protects 
the expression of the personality of the inventor to a lesser degree than copyright law, the 
justification is less important in the field of patents. It has therefore generally been referred 
to less and has traditionally not yet played a great role.18 We will therefore not analyse it 
here in more detail.  
Machlup & Penrose have neatly summarised the logic behind each of the four 
above-mentioned justifications and we cannot do better than quote them here:  
Argument type one: A man has a natural property right on his own ideas. Their 
appropriation by others must be condemned as stealing. Society is morally obligated to 
recognise and protect this property right. Property is in essence exclusive. Hence 
enforcement of exclusivity in the use of a patented invention is the only appropriate way for 
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society to recognise this property right.  
Argument type two: Justice requires that a man receive and therefore that society secure 
him, a reward for his services in proportion as these services are useful to society. 
Inventors render useful services. The most appropriate way to secure to inventors rewards 
commensurate with their services is by means of exclusive patent rights in their inventions.  
Argument type three: Industrial progress is desirable to society. Inventions and their 
exploitation are necessary to secure industrial progress. Neither invention nor exploitation 
will be obtained to any adequate extent unless inventors and capitalists have hopes that 
successful ventures will yield profits which make it worth their while to make their efforts 
and risk their money. The simplest, cheapest, and most effective way for society to hold 
out these incentives is to grant exclusive patent rights in inventions.  
Argument type four: Industrial progress is desirable to society. To secure it at a sustained 
rate it is necessary that new inventions become generally known as parts of the technology 
of society. In the absence of protection against immediate imitation of novel technological 
ideas, an inventor will keep his invention secret. The secret will die with him, and society 
will thereby lose the new art. Hence it is in the interest of society to induce the inventor to 
disclose his secret for the use of future generations. This can be best done by granting 
exclusive patent rights to the inventor in return for public disclosure of his invention.19   
There is general agreement that each of these four theories can alone justify the 
introduction of patent laws and are therefore independent of each other, *IIC 254  and 
that they can also be combined.20 This means that they are not (necessarily) conflicting. It 
is also clear that none of the patent justifications refer to the environment, let alone to the 
reduction in GHG emissions. It is not proposed to detail the content of the justifications as 
they are well known to intellectual property lawyers; the reader will be usefully referred to 
the literature.21 Nevertheless, a few words need to be added about a significant feature of 
the incentive theory, as this theory provides the single most important justification at the 
basis of current patent laws in Europe.22 Underlying this justification is the principle of 
neutrality of patent law.23 Neutrality means that patent law “ makes no value judgements” 
24
 and treats all inventions equally.25 In other words, there is no special regime or priority 
given to certain types of inventions.26 This is reflected in the Paris Convention of 1883. The 
neutrality principle is linked to the idea of legal specialisa *IIC 255  tion, which also 
pervades other areas of the law and means that “ each area of the law has a discrete and 
separate function which it should pursue and, correspondingly, that it is wrong for these 
functions to be confused or conflated” .27   
A final aspect should be mentioned: the patent system also acts as a way of knowing which 
inventions the state considers deserving of protection.28 This is actually quite an important 
aspect of the patent system for our discussion because, if the state is happy to grant 
patents to polluting inventions, it arguably sends the wrong signal. As has been noted, this 
“ public sanction”  function was considered very seriously “ in the ethical debates about 
whether patents should be granted for genetically modified humans, animals and 
plants” .29   
2. Not So Neutral: The Underlying Belief in Progress, the Notion of Ordre 
Public and the Special Treatment Given to Some Inventions   
When patent law is scrutinised more closely, one discovers that it is not completely neutral. 
Underlying the still dominant incentive function, which includes this notion of neutrality, is 
the intrinsic assumption that progress is good for society (sub-section 2.1.). In any case, 
whatever the rationale on which current patent laws are based, it appears that European 
(through the EPC), EU and, by a domino effect, national patent laws provide special 
regimes for some inventions. Some are excluded (those that are contrary to morality and 
ordre public ) whilst some are favoured (pharmaceutical and plant protection products) 
(sub-section 2.2.). Furthermore, some commentators have encouraged the questioning of 
patent law's traditional functions or even further, called for the patent system to change 
and grant special treatment to some inventions, in view of their utility to society 
(sub-section 2.3.).  
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2.1. Scratching Under the Surface of the Incentive Theory: Revisiting the 
Idea of Progress   
As stated in the first section, the incentive theory is still the main justification in Europe for 
patent laws nowadays, together with the disclosure function. *IIC 256  At the core of the 
incentive function lies the important assumption that technical progress is socially 
desirable.30 This assumption has not been discussed much as it is a generally accepted 
notion in today's society. However, because of this assumption, it can be said that patent 
law is not neutral. It is neutral in the sense that it will treat all technical inventions equally, 
but above this level of abstraction it is not neutral in the sense that it affirms that all 
technical inventions are necessarily desirable. By this assumption, patent laws take the 
view that technical progress is per se a good thing.31 The assumption hides a belief, if not 
an ideology, that technical progress will always improve human conditions. A summary of 
the “ progress ideology”  is therefore in order.  
In his very informative article, W. Van Caenegem shows that much of intellectual property 
law, and patent law in particular, is underpinned by the idea of and belief in progress.32 The 
idea of progress was developed during the Enlightenment, in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
continuing into the 19th century, and rested upon three precepts: (1) the continuous 
increase of human knowledge (intellectual enlightenment); (2) “ the practical usefulness 
and application of knowledge for the satisfaction of material wants and the solution of 
social problems; and [3] the belief that the application of knowledge would lead to a 
perfected man living in perfect conditions in a perfected world” .33 In other words, progress 
will lead to greater happiness, liberty and justice for all.34 Viewed in this way, “ the belief in 
progress was akin to a religion … and it gave rise to a new science of political economy, 
specifically aimed at maximising the satisfaction of want, i.e. material welfare” .35 The 
focus was therefore on material wealth and social advancement, not personal spiritual 
development.36 This idea of progress is based on the satisfaction of a desire for material 
improvement in contrast (specifically) to the Christian values of simplicity and frugality. In 
our contemporary society, this idea of *IIC 257  progress that science is there to satisfy 
every human want is still alive and well.37 This belief “ also tends to automatically equate 
technological change with an increase in the welfare of the individual, elevating innovation 
to the position of a good per se” .38   
However, this belief is not without its limits, negative consequences and critics. One limit is 
posed by our environment. By definition, the earth has finite resources so that progress 
cannot be continuous. This shows the danger of the belief. A counter-argument is to say 
that the answer is in progress itself. Technology will solve all problems even that of finite 
resources.39 A negative consequence of the progress ideology is that it can lead to cultural 
annihilation and imperialism. The introduction of material acquisitions of “ more advanced”  
societies will generally “ result in a partial destruction of the ‘ primitive’  society's 
culture” .40 This example shows that the progress ideology behind most intellectual 
property laws (as most of them were introduced in the West where the ideology was 
sparked) is not universal.41 Some cultures still favour imitation over innovation. Recently, 
the ideology of material progress has also been criticised by environmentalists, religious 
groups or political activists.42 One such criticism is that whilst to a certain extent it is 
undeniable that material progress brings happiness - if human beings lack basic food, 
medicine and shelter, they will inevitably be unhappy - there may come a point where the 
satisfaction of desires rather than needs is not necessary.43   
In sum, Western intellectual property laws are still imbued with the progress ideology and 
are thereby in this sense not neutral. Patent law is no exception.  
2.2. Special Treatment in Patent Laws   
Apart from this “ hidden”  subjective justification of current patent laws in Europe, there are 
also specific provisions that disprove patent laws' apparent neutrality. There are mainly 
two types of provisions: Art. 53(a) of the EPC which excludes inventions contrary to 
morality and ordre public (sub-section 2.2.1.) and supplementary protection certificates 
which grant a longer term of protection to medicinal and plant protection products 
(sub-section 2.2.2.). The content of these provisions is analysed hereunder in some detail. 
As will be seen, in relation to this article's inquiry, the ordre public provision *IIC 258  as 
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interpreted also prevents the patentability of environmentally damaging inventions.  
2.2.1. Morality and Ordre Public   
It has been said that until the issue of biotechnology arose, patent law was considered 
“ closed off from external considerations” ,44 i.e. neutral. This is not entirely correct as at 
least in the UK, Sec. 19 of the predecessor to the current Patent Act already provided that 
immoral inventions should be refused.45 Right from the origin of patent law, the first Patent 
Statute of 1623 already provided that a patent could only be granted if it was “ not contrary 
to law or mischievous to the State” ,46 and in fact every Patent Act in the UK carried this 
provision until now.47 Biotechnology and the issue of the patenting of life has not created 
but only exacerbated the issue.  
Article 53(a) EPC prevents the patenting of immoral inventions and inventions that are 
contrary to ordre public. 48 This is also reflected at the international level (albeit as an 
option to countries rather than an obligation as in the EPC) in Art. 27(2) of the TRIPs 
Agreement.49 It can therefore be said *IIC 259  that such inventions enjoy a special 
treatment, albeit negative. This treatment compares with the exclusion of computer 
programs, presentations of information, discoveries, etc. from patentability in Art. 52(2) 
EPC. Article 53's simple statement could by itself prove that patent law is not neutral as it 
discriminates between certain types of inventions. But one still needs to examine how the 
provision has been interpreted. For about two decades, there was no occasion for this 
Article to be interpreted through case law.50 The EPO's Official Guidelines for Examination 
recommended a very narrow interpretation of the provision51 and the origins of Art. 53(a) 
also favour such a restrictive interpretation, which was also the case in national patent laws 
in the past,52 although these guidelines are not binding. Then came the Onco-Mouse and 
Plant Genetic Systems cases.53   
These two cases considered what is meant by an invention contrary to ordre public or 
morality under the EPC. The rulings can be summarised as follows. Article 53(a) is an 
exception and must be narrowly construed.54 Morality and ordre public are two different 
concepts.55 Morality refers to “ the belief that some behaviour is right and acceptable 
whereas other behaviour is wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted 
norms which are deeply rooted in”  the European culture and ordre public “ covers the 
protection of public security and the physical security of the individuals as part of society. 
This concept encompasses also the protection of the environment.” 56 For a polluting 
invention to be contrary to ordre public, the *IIC 260  damage to the environment must 
be serious.57 Further, according to the EPO, technology is neutral. It can be used “ for 
constructive or destructive purposes. It would undoubtedly be against ‘ ordre public ’  or 
morality to propose a misuse or a destructive use of these techniques. Thus, under Article 
53(a) EPC, no patent may be granted in respect of an invention directed to such a use.” 58   
Even if it might be difficult to judge whether an invention is immoral or contrary to ordre 
public, the EPO agreed that it should nevertheless do so.59 This judgement cannot be made 
by way of surveys or opinion polls.60 This is because they can fluctuate according to various 
factors. To be relied on, they would have to be made ad hoc, which is scarcely feasible. 
There are two ways in which to evaluate whether an invention is contrary to morality or 
ordre public. One is a cost/benefit analysis (CBA). In other words, one should weigh up the 
risks and benefits of the invention. This is the approach adopted in the Onco-Mouse case, 
which dealt with the patenting of a genetically modified mouse so that it is more likely to 
develop cancer.61 There were three interests to be weighed in Onco-Mouse: the interests in 
reducing human disease, in not causing animals to suffer and in protecting the 
environment against uncontrolled dissemination of unwanted genes. As far as protection of 
the environment is concerned, the examining division said that the animals were only to be 
used in laboratories in controlled conditions by qualified staff.  
Therefore the risk of an uncontrolled release is practically limited to intentional misuse or 
blatant ignorance on the part of the laboratory personnel carrying out the tests. The mere 
fact that such uncontrollable acts are conceivable cannot be a major determinant for 
deciding whether a patent should be granted or not.62   
Weighing up these three interests, the examining division considered the invention 
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patentable and not immoral or contrary to ordre public. It added that an invention is not 
immoral because it is beneficial to mankind. This test (CBA) can be used in morality cases, 
ordre public cases or both.63   
*IIC 261  Another approach is that taken in the Plant Genetic Systems case. This case 
dealt with the patenting of plants genetically modified to resist herbicides. The Board held 
that the “ balancing exercise”  of benefits and disadvantages used in Onco-Mouse is “ not 
the only way of assessing patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC, but just one 
possible way, perhaps useful in situations in which an actual damage and/or disadvantage 
(for example, suffering of animals as in the case of Decision T 19/90 above) exists” .64 The 
facts of the PGS case led to the application of another test, that of sufficient evidence of 
actual disadvantages.65 This evidence must exist at the time the EPO is asked to revoke the 
patent.66 If no such evidence exists, there is no reason for not allowing the grant of, or for 
revoking, the patent on the basis of Art. 53(a). In the PGS case, the threat to the 
environment which the invention may cause was not sufficiently substantiated and the 
invention could therefore be patented.67   
In relation to the evaluation of the risks of the invention, the EPO held that whilst “ patent 
offices are placed at the crossroads between science and public policy” 68 they are not alone 
as there are authorities and bodies, in particular regulatory ones whose role it is inter alia 
to assess the hazards linked to the exploitation of a given technology.69 It previously held 
that it was not its task to regulate the handling of dangerous materials but that of 
specialised entities.70 This remains good law but the EPO will still be compelled by Art. 
53(a), on the basis of the patent application and the evidence submitted by the parties, to 
refuse the patenting of an invention contrary to morality or ordre public. To this extent, its 
role overlaps slightly with that of those bodies. Indeed, the Board specifically held that it is 
not always possible just by looking at the patent application to know the risks associated 
with the exploitation of the invention.71 However, the interpretation of the PGS case on this 
point is not unanimous. It has been argued, *IIC 262  erroneously in our view, that the 
Board meant that only the regulatory bodies can check the risks of the invention.72   
The above summary is in essence how the EPO evaluates the “ moral merit”  of an invention. 
It must be stressed that as the moral standards have been shaped by the TRIPs Agreement, 
the EPC and the EU through the so-called Biotechnology Directive,73 and thus by three 
different legal systems, the interpretation of the standard may differ.74 It has been argued 
that there is no understanding on the correct interpretation of the concepts of morality and 
ordre public. 75 The interpretation above is that of the EPO and only binds the EPO, and not 
always national courts.76 It does not bind the EU; therefore, the ECJ does not have to follow 
this definition of morality and ordre public when interpreting the Biotechnology Directive. 
In the same vein, a WTO panel's interpretation of serious prejudice to the environment 
may be different from that of the EPO. It is to be hoped, however, that national patent 
offices and courts would try and align themselves with the EPO's case law, as the UK would 
do.  
2.2.2. Supplementary Protection Certificates  
In contrast with morality and ordre public which apply negatively (i.e. to prevent the 
patenting of certain inventions), but also despite its apparent neutrality, patent law favours 
certain inventions according to the field of technology concerned. This consists of the 
special regime for medicinal and plant protection products by way of supplementary 
protection certificates (SPCs).77   
Because it often takes a long time for a patentee to receive the marketing authorisation for 
medicinal and plant protection products from the relevant European and/or national 
agency,78 he or she has less time than other patentees to reap the benefits of his or her 
patent as time is lost between the grant of the patent and that of the authorisation. 
Therefore, the EU passed two Regulations to grant an additional term of protection for 
medicinal and plant protection products.79 These are new rights and they do not apply to 
*IIC 263  patented inventions as such, so as not to conflict with Art. 63 EPC which sets out 
the maximum term of protection.80 But, in practice, the SPCs can be said to extend the 
patent term beyond 20 years when the authorisation has been long awaited. The maximum 
duration of an SPC is five years.81 The SPCs do not apply if the patent is at some point 
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invalidated or revoked.  
The SPCs arguably show that the EU favours inventions involving pharmaceuticals and 
plants over other types of inventions. However, it could also be argued that SPCs do not 
confer a special treatment but are simply there to restore the imbalance created by the 
difference between inventions that require an authorisation and those that do not, and 
which the patent owner can exploit right from the moment his or her patent is granted by 
the EPO or national office. Notwithstanding this argument, it can still be argued on the 
exclusive basis of Art. 53(a) EPC that patent law is not totally neutral. If one wanted even 
more proof of this differentiation, one could also cite the exclusion of certain inventions, 
especially methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy (Art. 
52(4) EPC), which like Art. 53(a) negatively treats such inventions by excluding them from 
patentability.  
2.3. Conclusion   
At the close of this subsection, it is therefore disputable that patent law is totally neutral, 
especially towards environmentally damaging inventions. Even if it can be argued that the 
protection of the environment, and by implication the reduction of GHG, is not one of the 
patent goals, the existence of Art. 53(a) EPC and its interpretation by the EPO show that 
patent law has the potential to be congruent with it. In principle, the excessive release of 
GHG, and definitely that of other per se polluting substances, by an invention can 
potentially seriously damage the environment. In any case, the fact that the EPO has 
agreed to look at the impact of patents on the environment may show that the case law is 
already developing towards recognition of another role of patent law: that of protection of 
the environment.  
However, neither the EPC nor national laws take a clear stance in respect of eco-friendly 
inventions. In other words, they do not treat them specifically. Article 53(a) as interpreted 
by the EPO does not encourage the patenting of eco-friendly inventions, but merely 
discourages inventions that damage the environment and prevents those that seriously 
damage it. Patent law is still neutral in the sense that all inventions, whatever their utility, 
are treated in the same way. The next section reviews arguments to change patent law to 
take account of the utility of inventions.  
*IIC 264  3. Should the Patent Justifications Be Revisited and Green 
Inventions Be Treated Differently?   
At different periods, an - albeit small - number of authors have called for a reconsideration 
of the neutrality of patents, and even the justifications for patents. Underlying their 
reflections are two related ideas: the purpose of granting patents is to benefit society and 
the blind belief in progress should be reconsidered. Some have even called for a 
modification of the patent system to grant special treatment to some inventions, 
depending on their utility to society. Section 3 first retraces the history of these arguments 
and then examines which patent justifications are more apt to take these ideas into 
account before concluding.  
3.1. What Does the Literature Say?   
The idea that patents should only be granted to socially useful inventions is not new. As 
early as the 19th century, it was already argued that the social utility of an invention should 
determine its fate. R. Macfie, one of the fiercest anti-patent advocates of the 19th century, 
recommended this idea. Although he was against patents, Macfie was in favour of 
rewarding inventors for the invention's social utility (by way of prizes rather than 
patents).82 In fact, until the middle of the 19th century, the quality of the invention 
mattered a lot.83 In the UK for instance, the 1852 Patent Law Amendment required that the 
invention be of great public utility.84 Then this idea was abandoned as it was gradually 
believed that the law “ was ill equipped to make subjective, qualitative decisions” .85 It was 
thought that, since the value of an invention can only be known retrospectively, one should 
not make value judgements when granting patents.86 Thus questions of judgement have 
not been made in 20th century intellectual property law.87 Merit or value is (still) irrelevant 
in copyright law for instance.  
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The idea of discriminating between patents according to their value came back into fashion 
in the 1970s, probably because this was the time when Japan and the United States 
introduced a special regime for environmentally friendly inventions.88 This change was 
probably triggered because commen *IIC 265  tators started doubting that progress has 
only beneficial effects.89 Two authors re-proposed special treatment of certain inventions 
at the dawn of the 1970s. For Blum, who notes the devastating effects that the application 
of some inventions that emanate harmful substances can have on human beings and the 
environment in general,90 patents can play a role in the protection of the environment.91 
Accordingly, patent law should stimulate inventions which preserve the environment or 
repair environmental damage. Beier more generally makes the case that patent law should 
discriminate according to the social utility of the invention.92 In other words, patent law's 
neutrality should be scrapped.93 Present patent laws have a meaningless requirement of 
utility as it is already fulfilled if any sort of utility exists.94 On the other hand, whilst it is true 
that the idea of social utility also appears in the exclusions to patentability, mainly the 
exclusion of inventions that are immoral or offend ordre public, 95 patent laws do not make 
differentiations between inventions of great and little social utility. As Beier's image clearly 
puts it, “ [t]he improvement of a shoelace is treated the same as the pioneer invention of 
a new antibiotic” .96 In his view,  
[i]f it is the purpose of patent protection to encourage inventions which are useful to 
society, then two conclusions should be self-evident; first, inventions that are of no use or 
even damaging to society should not be patented and second, inventions that are of special 
and particular utility for the economy or for society should be patentable and even enjoy 
preferential treatment.97   
These ideas meet with the prohibition of inventions contrary to morality and ordre public, 
and more specifically with the ruling in Plant Genetic *IIC 266  Systems, 98 and with 
Blum's more specific proposal that patent law should stimulate green technologies.  
These ideas have probably re-emerged in the 1990s because of the development of 
biotechnology and the subsequent debate about the appropriateness of patenting life. 
Whilst not elaborating new theories and proposals, several authors have simply pointed out 
that the current justification of patent law based on the blind belief in progress should be 
reassessed because of the negative consequences it can have on society, the environment 
and culture.99 Patent law is not “ a neutral instrument and technological innovation is not a 
‘ good’  in itself” .100 The granting of a patent “ corresponds to a public reward for a 
contribution to scientific progress and consequently to the well-being of humankind: thus 
inventions which create threats of irreversible damage to the global environment do not 
fulfil this basic requirement” .101 In sum, as Beier already proposed, patent law should 
satisfy human needs. 102   
3.2. Are the Justifications Amenable to the Goal of Environmental 
Protection?   
The relevance of these proposals has increased in the 21st century. In the light of the 
current global warming problem, it is arguably time to seriously review the tercentennial 
patent law theories and their underlying assumptions to see if they still make sense.103 
Some justifications are more easily reconcilable with or can integrate the protection of the 
environment better than others. The reward theory makes the assumption that all 
inventions are useful. This assumption is arguably incorrect. Some are not useful (for 
instance if they are trivial or offensive to morals or ordre public ) and some are less useful 
than others. So perhaps it is possible to keep the reward theory to justify patents by 
modifying its underlying assumption as follows: if an invention is useful, it is just to reward 
the inventor. It may be easier to reshape the justification of patent law if it is made on the 
labour theory. *IIC 267  According to Locke's writings, humans must leave enough that is 
equally as good in the commons and cannot destroy or spoil the commons (so-called 
“ non-waste condition” ).104 If this does not provide an argument to discriminate between 
inventions, it definitely means that no one is allowed to harm the commons. Therefore, an 
invention may not harm the environment, as the environment is indisputably the 
commons.105 Also, as opposed to the incentive theory, the concept of neutrality is not 
inherent to these two justifications so that they are more amenable to differential 
treatment.106   
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It is arguably more difficult to re-shape patent law's role pursuant to the incentive theory 
because of the belief in material progress.107 Indeed, as implied in part of the literature, the 
themes of technology and the environment are intrinsically linked; technology has an 
impact on the environment because it changes previous environmental conditions.108 
Therefore, patent laws, as engines driving technological advance, are responsible for the 
impact patented inventions have on the environment. Pollution comes mainly from 
industrial activity109 and therefore from new products that were once or are still protected 
by patents or as trade secrets. One could therefore argue that the progress ideology is one 
of the causes of environmental damage, including the increase of GHG in the earth's 
atmosphere. If technological progress had not been encouraged by patents, then less (no 
additional) environmental damage would have occurred. This may have been the case 
originally but now, with the EPO's broader interpretation of the ordre public provision so as 
to exclude the patenting of inventions seriously damaging the environment, it is arguably 
no longer the case or at least to a lesser extent. On the other hand, the utilitarian rationale 
presupposes that patent laws should function as incentives to invent new technologies. 
Therefore, it should not prevent the patent laws from granting greater incentives to the 
development of especially valuable new technologies.110 This simple line of reasoning could 
solve the problem.  
*IIC 268  Nevertheless, there is scope for argument that the progress ideology includes 
the protection of the environment. One reason is that it aims at the improvement of human 
material conditions. A healthy environment is part of these material conditions. Even so, 
the almost religious belief that science will solve all problems, including that of global 
warming and more generally pollution, fails to convince everyone.111 Another arguably 
stronger reason is that “ progress”  is a vague and malleable concept. The initial 18th 
century notion is limited to material progress. The belief is that material progress will lead 
to greater happiness, liberty and justice for all. It is easy to see with hindsight that this is 
not always (if at all) the case. The link between the two is less than certain (are we 
necessarily happier because we have mobile phones or bigger cars?). But progress is not 
limited to material progress. Progress can also consist in individual or collective spiritual 
happiness, including better social relationships. If the original 18th century belief is 
modified to focus on human needs rather than human wants, to extend to social progress 
(better human relationships), and even to the earth's needs (as encompassing all living 
and inanimate things), then there may be some hope to “ ethically”  justify and thereby 
give a more solid and socially acceptable basis to patent law. With this extended notion of 
progress, the furtherance of environmental protection is fully within the utilitarian function, 
which is, as we know, still the dominant justification for patents. In other words, it can be 
said that it is the function of patent law to promote eco-friendly inventions because 
progress must improve not only human but also animal and plant life. From being 
anthropocentric, patent law becomes biocentric or even ecocentric.112 Remodelling the 
incentive function in this way, that is, away from the 18th century western Enlightenment 
view of purely material progress, allows the consideration within patent laws of 
environmental concerns.  
As to the disclosure function, the same assumption that industrial progress is desirable to 
society underlies it, and therefore it can also be retained if the *IIC 269  belief is modified 
in the same way. Thus the argument made above for the incentive theory is equally 
applicable.  
Some commentators have made arguments beyond the patent law rationales, on general 
terms, not linked to the environment. Simply, there is no compelling reason why patent law 
cannot be used for other than purely economic ends;113 for instance, as a tool to regulate 
the impact of technology on the environment or health.114 Further, some have even argued 
that we can perhaps re-shape our intellectual property laws as we go along, as the 
prescriptive power of any of the current theories is very limited, notwithstanding their 
value.115 Others have recently challenged the view, which is generally taken for granted, 
that intellectual property protection has an objective at all, or else is an end in itself.116 Yet 
others argue that, based on the information we have, we could differentiate.117 Accordingly, 
the invention would have to pass a test to be treated differently. For instance, we have 
information that the IT and the pharmaceutical industries regard patents differently. Whilst 
the IT industry does not generally need patents in order to innovate, the pharmaceutical 
industry heavily depends on them. To differentiate, we would need to devise a “ stable 
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test” .118 It has been asked, again generally, whether, as the evidence that patents 
motivate inventive activity is inconclusive, we should perhaps look at other reasons for 
keeping patents.119 Implicitly this may mean we should be “ freed”  from an exclusively 
economic approach to patents.  
The indeterminacy of economic analysis, at the very least, should be understood as an 
opportunity, an obligation, to engage in a qualitative analysis of patent policy that takes 
into account not only economic growth but other values including the content and process 
of production, and fair distribution of social goods.120   
Finally, recent economic studies also lead to the belief that uniformity within intellectual 
property laws leads to welfare losses, meaning that differentia *IIC 270  tion makes sense 
economically.121 But beyond that, in our view, we may also need more differentiation, not 
only for economic reasons, but because differentiation leads to more justice. Whilst the law 
may be guided by economics, it must not forget other aspects like the public interest and 
human rights,122 including more broadly sustainable development. To be subversive but 
only to spur the debate, who said we were constrained by goals or functions?  
If some or all the arguments made in this sub-section are valid, patent laws should be 
modified according to the general criterion of social utility and the more specific criterion 
(sub-category of utility) of the environmental impact of the invention, and even more 
specifically its carbon footprint. The first question to ask before granting a patent would be: 
how is this invention benefiting society as a whole, taking into account not only humans but 
the environment (i.e. plants, animals, climate, earth)? What are the consequences of the 
invention on the environment? It is not because it is new and inventive that it is necessarily 
always good or useful to society.  
But the ultimate question before thinking further would be: is this the right way to cater for 
environmental concerns? Should this not be the exclusive role of environmental laws? Are 
environmental laws not already providing the answer? In other words, how should 
environmental concerns, including the reduction of GHG, be addressed in general, within 
patent laws, environmental laws and other laws? The question whether the protection of 
the environment is part of patent law's role or is extrinsic to it (in other words, that it is the 
role of environmental laws only) has significant consequences. If the first approach is 
adopted, patent laws must either discourage polluting inventions or encourage green ones, 
or both. On the other hand, if the regulation of the environment is entirely left to 
environmental law, patents can still be granted on some polluting inventions. However, 
this would send conflicting messages to inventors. It is right for me to obtain a patent on a 
polluting product or process, but on the other hand, I cannot exploit it as such (because 
environmental law prohibits it). On the one hand, the state endorses the invention; on the 
other, it condemns it.123 Incidentally, this does *IIC 271  not sit well with the public 
sanction “ justification” . Moreover, if environmental concerns are not integrated within 
patent laws, there is no incentive to invent green technologies as they will not be better 
rewarded than others, so why bother to make the extra effort?  
These questions are answered in another previously published article.124 For the benefit of 
the reader, they are briefly summarised here. The environmental provisions of the EC 
Treaty (ECT) require that patent laws take environmental concerns and especially the 
problem of global warming into account. According to Art. 6 ECT, “ environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the 
Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development” . Article 3 lists among others: (h) the approximation 
of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the internal 
market, (m) the strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry, and (n) 
promotion of research and technological development. These three policies are the most 
relevant in respect of intellectual property.  
Currently, patent laws do not integrate the environmental principles. A reform of patent 
law is therefore in order. Concretely, how can patent laws be reshaped to respect the 
principle of integration of environmental principles? Three systems can be envisaged: 
negative, positive or mixed. In all cases, patent laws would add a requirement of 
eco-friendliness for each invention. Within this sub-category, one could further distinguish 
inventions that emit less or no GHG. A negative system (preventing the patenting of 
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polluting inventions) is already to some extent in place by virtue of the interpretation of Art. 
53(a) EPC. Only inventions meeting a certain threshold would be considered “ green”  and 
therefore patentable. A positive system is not yet in place but would require a preferential 
treatment of green inventions in comparison with other inventions. If the invention were to 
exceed the eco-friendliness requirement, it would receive favoured treatment.125 Several 
treatments can be envisaged and can be applied alone or in combination to such especially 
green inventions (e.g. faster examination, reduction of patent office fees, longer term of 
protection…).126 A mixed system would prohibit polluting inventions and at the same time 
favour eco-friendly ones and is, it is submitted, the best system. The way the system would 
work is as follows. The inventor would indicate in his patent application that its invention 
fulfils the criterion of eco-friendliness. This criterion needs to be tailored to respect the 
targets set by environmental law. As far as global warming is concerned, *IIC 272  it could 
be said that, in order to be patented, every process or product that emits GHG should emit 
8% less than the product's emissions in 1990 (the target the EU agreed to respect in the 
context of the ratification of Kyoto Protocol). If the invention emits even less than this 
target, it would qualify to receive preferential treatment. This treatment can be modulated 
in function of the degree of eco-friendliness of the invention. The relevant regulatory body 
(e.g. European Environmental Agency) would check whether the product or process fulfils 
these requirements and advise the patent office.  
Conclusion   
It is generally agreed that patent laws in Europe are mainly neutral. They neither 
encourage nor prevent the patenting of certain inventions over others. But this statement 
is a façade. Patent laws are not as neutral as they may seem at first glance, unless it can 
be argued that the “ exceptions”  reviewed in this article are there to confirm the rule. In 
fact, patent laws even cater, to some extent, for the protection of the environment. A 
closer look shows that, by means of Art. 53(a) EPC and corresponding national provisions, 
patent laws albeit “ negatively”  and partially127 fulfil this latter aim. The century-long 
prohibition of immoral inventions may provide an argument for the continuing prevention 
within patent law of polluting inventions and, beyond that, may somewhat encourage 
green patenting. But this role is not precisely defined in the case law, let alone in the 
statutory law. In view of the urgency of the present climatic situation, we need to do more. 
Current justifications do not prevent taking environmental concerns, and more particularly 
climate change, into account and some even seem amenable to it. Also, since each 
justification is arguably independent from each other,128 i.e. we do not need to follow them 
all to justify having patents, it is easy to re-shape patent laws so that they cater for the 
protection of nature, including cooling the planet. The incentive and disclosure functions, 
which still underlie current patent laws, can accommodate environmental protection. 
Although the specific issue of patent laws' role in environmental protection has not yet 
been debated much, let alone recently,129 the majority of commentators who have 
discussed it are also in favour of treating beneficial inventions, and specifically green ones, 
differently. In addition, in a more general way, minds recently seem to be open to the fact 
that patent justifications may, perhaps owing to many changing factors this century, have 
to be completely re-assessed. It would definitely be worth rethinking the justifications for 
and the roles of patent laws in depth, as transformations have occurred since legislation 
was drafted in the 19th century, given two centuries of tremendous, incredibly fast and 
sometimes wild scientific develop *IIC 273  ment. In this light, and specifically concerning 
environmental protection, it is submitted that patent laws should be rethought in order to 
satisfy human needs rather than wants, but also those of the planet as a whole. The fact 
that patents could become more ecocentric and, yes, in a way “ ethical”  would be more 
than welcome now, at a time when the public's resentment towards intellectual property in 
general and patents in particular is growing rapidly. We disagree with the view that the EPO 
should not be promoting and preserving morality and that a change from the current 
light-touch regime would not be justified because the three necessary conditions - “ some 
event impelling a re-think and consequent change; some significant benefits for society; no 
impairment of the patent system in serving its primary purpose”  - are not fulfilled.130 On 
the contrary, global warming is such an event that society would greatly benefit from “ ever 
greener patent laws” , which does not detract from patent law's primary purpose, if this 
means the incentive and/or disclosure functions. Finally, favoured treatment could be 
crafted without contradicting the EPC or TRIPs so that we would respect our international 
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obligations.131   
This article has shown that patent law already, even if partially and timidly, safeguards the 
environment and also that it is open to a fuller role in this respect. The next question is 
whether patent law should be fulfilling this role in addition to environmental law. And if so, 
what role - modest or more pronounced - it should play in the prevention of pollution and 
the reduction of GHG, and how it should be implemented in practice. In a previous 
publication,132 the author has provided positive answers to the questions that are 
summarised here.  
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